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Notes
Applying Rule 11 to Rid Courts of
Frivolous Litigation Without Chilling
the Bar's Creativity
Sometimes there are reasons to sue when one cannot win.
Bad court decisions must be challenged if they are to be
overruled, but the early challenges are certainly hopeless. The
first attorney to challenge Plessy v Ferguson was certainly
bringing a frivolous action, but his efforts and the efforts of
others eventually led to Brown v Board of Education.*
INTRODUCTION
Along with the 1983 proposals to amend Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' came valid concerns. The
proponents of the new rule declared that the changes were nec-
essary to deter frivolous claims and abusive pleading and motion
tactics.2 The subjective "good faith" standard of former Rule
11 had been ineffective in discouraging misuse of the judicial
* Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F Supp. 558, 575 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
FED. R. Civ P 11 (1980) (amended 1983).
2 Excerpt from the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 189 (1983) [hereinafter Report of
the Judicial Conference Committee]. The Judicial Conference Committee states: "These
proposals are designed to reduce discovery abuse and the abuse of process and for
the scheduling and management of litigation by district judges. " Id. FED. R. Crw
P 11 advisory committee's note provides: "Greater attention by the district courts to
pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should
discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by
lessening frivolous claims or defenses."
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system.3 Those opposing the amendments, however, feared the
changes would cause extensive satellite litigation, erode attorney-
client relationships4, and chill creative advocacy 5 Nevertheless,
the rule was amended on August 1, 1983, with the hope that
more precise standards and mandatory sanctions would rid the
courts of unnecessary and frivolous litigation.6
3 FED. R. Civ P 11 advisory committee's note ("Expenence shows that in
practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses."); Joseph, The Trouble with
Rule 11: Uncertain Standards and Mandatory Sanctions, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at
87 (noting that "the 'safe harbor' exception for subjective good faith swallowed the
rule"); Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 182 (1985) ("Resort to frivolous litigation, maintenance of baseless defenses,
and harassment of one's opponent are practices that judges and lawyers engaged in civil
litigation encounter regularly.").
4 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 2, at 191-92.
1 FED. R. Crv P 11 advisory committee's note ("The rule is not intended to
chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.").
6 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 2, at 192 ("[The
majority was of the view, either expressly or impliedly, that precise standards, including
a duty of reasonable inquiry, would reduce frivolous claims, defenses or motions by
leading litigants to stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing
papers."); see FED. R. Crv P 11 advisory committee's note.
'Rule 11 provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not rep-
resented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and
state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The
rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome
by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corrob-
orating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
[there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay]
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission
is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. [or is signed with intent
to defeat the purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false
and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served.
For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appro-
priate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or
indecent matter is inserted.] If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed
APPLYING RULE 11
Has amended Rule 11 been successful? Without question,
the number of Rule 11 decisions has increased dramatically since
the 1983 amendments. 7 Such a result is not surprising because
the rule "generates its own momentum." '8 Yet, complaints abound
that no umform standards have emerged 9 and that the rule itself
has become a means of harassment and delay 10 In spite of the
criticisms, Professor Arthur Miller, a principal drafter of the
new rule, has stated that Rule 11 is working "exactly the way it
was supposed to" and is a "useful weapon against unnecessary
litigation."" In the process, however, the rule may be deterring
creative and novel legal theories, an effect not intended by the
rule's drafters.' 2
This Note advocates the view that Rule 11 can be applied to
achieve a higher level of responsibility among attorneys without
stifling attempts to expand current law Initially, the background
of Rule 11 and the changes made to Rule 11 by the 1983
amendments -will be discussed. 3 Then the policies and effects of
Rule 11 will be explored in conjunction with the various ap-
proaches courts have taken in applying the rule.' 4 The focus of
in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both,
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
2A J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.01 13] (2d ed. 1984) (additions
made by the 1983 amendments in italics and deletions in brackets).
I See Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313,
1326 (1986). Between August 1, 1983, and August 1, 1985, 233 reported district court
cases involved Rule 11 sanctions. Because few distnct court opinions are published,
however, the number of Rule 11 cases are undoubtedly much greater than those found
in the reporters. Id., see also Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule
11 Sanctions, 100 HAgv L. REv 630, 631 n.5 (1987) (noting there have been more than
200 reported cases involving Rule 11 sanctions since the 1983 amendments).
I Joseph, supra note 3, at 88; see FED. R. Crv P I1 advisory committee's note
(with the reasonableness standard "it is expected that a greater range of circumstances
will trigger its violation").
I Joseph, supra note 3, at 89.
10 N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at 30-31.
" Id.
12 See supra note 5.
13 See infra notes 16-96 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 97-248 and accompanying text.
1987-88]
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this Note will be on those approaches that do not sacrifice "one
of the chief virtues of the American justice system, the creativity
of the bar "s
I. THE NEED TO STREAMlINE LITIGATION
During the past decade, the federal courts have been inun-
dated with an unprecedented number of lawsuts.1 6 As a result
of this "litigation explosion,' 1 7 the American litigant has been
subjected to 'undue delays and excessive costs.s In 1981 the
Judical Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure proposed several amendments stressing judi-
cial management and attorney restraint.' 9 Because many com-
mentators felt that abuse of the court system had contributed to
the problem of increased litigation,20 Rule 11 was specifically
amended, effective August 1, 1983,21 to deter attorneys' abusive
tactics and to rid the courts of frivolous claims. 22
Prior to the 1983 amendments to Rule 11,23 an attorney's
signature on a pleading certified that "to the best of his knowl-
11 Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV 1, 10
(1984-85).
16 "In 1953 the federal courts had 99,000 United States District Court filings and
3,200 appellate filings. In 1983 Chief Justice Burger reported current filings of 240,000
in the district courts and 28,000 at the appellate level, an increase of 142% and 775%,
respectively, in 25 years." Johnson & Cassady, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Res-
ponses to Them-What Relief Is Available? 36 ALA. L. REv 927, 927 n.1 (1985).
'7 Miller, supra note 15, at 2-12, 20 & n.62.
" Id. at 3; see Nelken, supra note 7, at 1313 (changes to Rule 11 were "provoked
by a decade of criticism of the spiraling costs, delay, and abuse that have come to
characterize the pretrial stage of litigation").
11 Lovejoy, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(June 1981), in RESOURCE MATERIALS, CIvIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS 195, 197-98 (S. Schreiber ed. 1981).
20 Arthur Miller, one of the drafters of the amendments, made the following
observation regarding the American judicial system:
In many ways, contemporary federal litigation is analogous to the dance
marathon contests of yesteryear. The object of the exercise is to select a
partner from across the "v," get out on the dance floor, hang on to one's
client, and then drift aimlessly and endlessly to the litigation music for as
long as possible, hoping that everyone else will collapse from exhaustion.
Miller, supra note 15, at 9.
2 FED. R. Crv P 11 (1980) (amended 1983).
2 FE. R. Crv P 11 advisory committee's note; Report of the Judicial Conference
Committee, supra note 2, at 192.
2 Rule 11 was promulgated in 1938 and was never changed prior to the 1983
amendments. Nelken, supra note 7, at 1314.
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edge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay "24 The rule placed no
affirmative duty on the attorney to investigate the claim 25 and
appeared to require no investigation beyond the four corners of
the document. 26 Not surprisingly, courts were confused as to
what conduct violated the rule.27 They settled on the lenient
standard of subjective bad faith and required that a claim be
"entirely without color and made for reasons of harassment or
delay or for other improper purposes" before triggering a vio-
lation.28 This high threshold provided a "safe harbor" 29 for
attorneys filing groundless pleadings.
In addition to the confusion regarding the standard of con-
duct required by the rule, courts were also uncertain as to the
type of sanctions to impose upon violators. 30 The rule stated
that a pleading "may be stricken as a sham and false ' 3' and
that for wilful violations "attorney[s] may be subjected to ap-
propriate disciplinary action. ' 32 The language did not require
sanctions, leaving it within the court's discretion whether to
penalize the violator.3 3 Striking a pleading was viewed as an
extreme pumshment against the client, not the attorney, and
1 FED. R. CIv P II.
2 Carter, The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FoRDHAmt L. Rav 4, 4 (1985);
Rothschild, Fenton & Swanson, Rule 11: Stop, Think, and Investigate, 11 LMGATON,
Winter 1985, at 13.
21 But see Rhinehart v. Stauffer, 638 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Before
filing a civil action, the attorney has a duty to make an investigation to ascertain that
it has at least some merit, and further to ascertain that the damages sought appear to
bear a reasonable relation to injuries actually sustained.").
" FED. R. Civ P 11 advisory committee's note ("There has been considerable
confusion as to (1) the circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or motion
or taking disciplinary action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign
pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate sanctions.").
u Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Browmng v.
Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977)).
19 Joseph, supra note 3, at 87; see Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985),- cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987) (stating that
"subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did").
3 See supra note 27.
1, See Carter, supra note 25, at 7 (noting that courts would strike a pleading under
Rule II "only if it contradicted matters of public record," or if it was "sham and false
beyond peradventure," or if the plaintiff "had no capacity to sue").
11 FED. R. Civ P 11.
33 Id.
1987-88]
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thus was seldom used.34 Furthermore, the rule failed to specify
the sanctions available for wilful violations .35 The omission of
available sanctions and the subjective bad faith standard led
courts to impose penalties only in extreme cases.3 6 Moreover,
the courts' reluctance to sanction attorneys37 caused general dis-
regard of the rule.38 As a result, Rule 11, an ineffective deterrent
against abusive and dilatory practices, 39 was targeted for major
revision by the 1983 amendments. 40
II. AMENDED RULE 11
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 focus on attorney respon-
sibility by expanding the rule's certification requirement 41 and
by providing clearer standards for measuring attorney conduct. 42
The amendments also focus on deterring judicial system abuse
by establishing mandatory sanctions for Rule 11 violations. 43
FED. R. Civ P 11, advisory committee's note (commenting that the provision
was rarely used and that courts "have tended to confuse the issue of attorney honesty
with the merits of the action"); Miller, supra note 15, at 25 (stating that "striking
pleadings have seemed too draconian to impose on clients for what typically is the
misbehavior of the attorney or mere procedural failings").
3, FED. R. Civ P 11.
16 See Buchanan v. Blase, No. 83-C-2932 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1984) (no available
sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the inherent power of the court except
for the most blatant conduct); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365
F Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (class action plaintiffs violated Rule 11 when they sued
177 mortgage institutions by choosing named defendants from listings in telephone book;
defendants' costs and expenses as sanctions against plaintiffs); Nelken, supra note 7, at
1315 n.18.
17 FED. R. Crv P 11 advisory committee's note: "The perceived reluctance of
judges to impose sanctions has several sources: judges' sympathy, as former practitioners,
for the pressures on lawyers ., concern that available sanctions often pumsh the client
for the lawyer's misdeeds; and uncertainty about the court's power to impose sanctions
on its own initiative." Nelken, supra note 7, at 1321-22.
11 Id. at 1316 (suggesting that the rule's disuse was not caused by the language of
Rule 11, but the belief that attorneys should not be sanctioned).
11 FED. R. Civ P 11 advisory committee's note.
40 Nelken, supra note 7, at 1316.
4, C. WRIGHT, A. MInER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1333
(Supp. 1987) [hereinafter WIuor].
42 See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 2, at 190; Lovejoy,
supra note 19, at 208.
41 FED. R. Civ P 11 advisory committee's note; Report of the Judicial Conference
Committee, supra note 2, at 190.
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A. The Certification Requirement
Amended Rule 11 expands on the certification requirement
by applying it to motions and other papers as well as to plead-
ings." The rule also applies to unrepresented parties. 45 Thus,
under the amended rule, the signature of an attorney or pro se
party certifies two things: (1) that based on a "reasonable inquiry
[the paper] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law," and (2) that "it is not interposed
for any improper purpose.1 46 Courts and commentators have
drawn from the rule a two-prong analysis, the first prong dealing
with frivolous litigation, and the second prong dealing with
abusive tactics.47
B. The First Prong: Reasonable Inquiry into Facts and Law
The first prong of Rule 11 places an affirmative duty on the
signer to conduct a prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the
law 48 The inquiry is to be measured against a standard of
"reasonableness under the circumstances, ' 49 an objective stan-
" WuicOHT, supra note 41, at 175.
41 FED. R. Crv P 11 (1980) (amended 1983).
" Id. See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 185-86 for a discussion of the certification
responsibilities of co-counsel and forwarding counsel.
47 Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that
"[t]he certificate is addressed to two separate problems, first, the problem of
frivolous filings; and second, the problem of rmsusing judicial procedures as a weapon
for personal or economic harassment"); Nelken, supra note 7, at 1320 & n.51.
"8 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987) (stating that "new Rule 11 explicitly and unambig-
uously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the viability of a pleading before it is signed"); FED. R. Crv P 11 advisory
committee's note; WGrHT, supra note 41, at § 1333.
41 FED. R. Civ. P 11 advisory committee's note; Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 194:
What is reasonable depends on the circumstances. For example, an attorney
holding himself out as an expert in the field can be expected to be better
versed in the controlling law than a general practitioner; a firm with
substantial research facilities, including access to Lexis or Westlaw, can be
expected to discover authorities that may be overlooked by less well-
endowed lawyers.
KENTUCKY LAW Joui[AL
dard as interpreted by the courts.50 With this lower threshold,
attorney conduct should be violative of the rule more often than
with the subjective standard of former Rule 11.51
When determining whether an attorney 2 has conducted a
reasonable prefiling inquiry, 53 the Advisory Committee cautions
courts against using the "wisdom of hindsight. 5 4 Obviously,
the attorney's knowledge of the facts and the law should not be
viewed in light of information revealed during the discovery or
the trial process. Rather, the standard of "reasonableness under
the circumstances" applies to facts and law which the attorney
should have reasonably believed when the paper was filed.15 In
"' E.g., Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Mhe court must first
examine the actions at issue according to a standard of objective reasonableness.");
Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1222 n.1 (6th Cir. 1986) (Guy, J., dissenting)
("The parties and the court are in agreement that the standard used in evaluating an
alleged Rule II violation is an objective one."); Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829 ("The new
text represents an intentional abandonment of the subjective focus of the-Rule in favor
of an objective one."); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 205 (7th
Cir. 1985) ("The standard used is an objective one of reasonableness under the circum-
stances. "); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("Unlike the pre-1983 amendment Rule 11, which required a showing of subjective bad
faith, Rule I1 now incorporates, an objective test."); Eastway Constr. Corp., 762
F.2d at 253-54 ("[W]e hold that a showing of subjective bad faith is no longer required
to trigger the sanctions imposed by the rule.").
S1 FED. R. Crv. P 11 advisory committee's note.
William O. Bertelsman, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
made the following observation:
No more unfounded motions for summary judgment or responses thereto.
No more suing a battery of defendants when a reasonable investigation
would show some of them are not liable. No more demal of a debt due in
a collection action just to buy your client some time. No more shotgunmng
the complaint with a couple of glamorous but spurious claims to add some
pizazz to the more mundane but valid ones. And perhaps most importantly,
no more getting off the hook by relying on the natural reluctance of the
trial judge to sock you with sanctions.
Bertelsman, Rule 11 Rears Its Ugly Head, Ky. Bench and Bar, Summer 1986, 21, 21,
50.
'" When referring to certification requirements, use of the word "attorney" in this
Note is intended to include pro se parties.
13 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F Supp. 558, 565 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987) (observing that courts apply a standard of
"frivolousness" when determimng whether a party has violated the prefiling inquiry).
-, FED. R. Civ P II advisory committee's note; Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 197
("To avoid the risk, or the appearance of relying on hindsight, the decision on sanctions
is best made as promptly as possible after the violation is disclosed.").
11 FED. R. Civ P 11 advisory committee's note. In Albright, the Sixth Circuit
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determining "reasonableness" the court may consider the time
available for inquiry, the sources of factual information, and
the plausibility of the legal arguments set forth in the paper.56
Because courts are allowed to relax the standard under extenu-
ating circumstances, arguably the rule's effect will not be so
harsh as to "chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories. '57
The rule also requires that an argument for the "extension,
modification, or reversal" of the law be made in good faith.58
This part of the rule retains the subjective language of former
Rule 11. Nevertheless, knowledge of existing law is necessary to
make a good faith argument for its change.5 9 Some courts have
held that the "good faith" language requires an objective anal-
ysis rather than a subjective one.60
held that the plaintiff had failed to conduct a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the facts.
Her suit against nine pharmaceutical manufacturers alleged that the defendants had
manufactured and distributed tetracycline-based drugs which caused the discoloration of
her teeth. Discovery revealed that only three of the defendants should have been sued
by the plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit reversed the distnct court's demal of Rule 11 sanctions.
Albright, 788 F.2d at 1218-19, 1221.
36 FED. R. Crv P 11 advisory committee's note; see Albright, 788 F.2d at 1220-
21. The Albright court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a reasonable inquiry was
conducted due to the following circumstances: her attorneys filed eight separate suits
against tetracycline manufacturers on the same day; medical records were old and
difficult to read; certain medical records could not be found; and, the defendant had
been named in similar suits.
1' FED. R. Crv P 11 advisory committee's note; see infra notes 169-76 and
accompanying text.
FED. R. Crv P 11.
" Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831 (stating that "[a] good faith belief in the merit of a
legal argument is an objective condition which a competent attorney attains only after
'reasonable inquiry' "J.
60 Id., see Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d at 254 (the rule is violated if "after
reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the
pleading is a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law").
William Schwarzer, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of California,
made the following statement regarding arguments for extending the law:
Subject then to the obligation to disclose the controlling authorities
he can reasonably be expected to have discovered, counsel is free to make
an argument at odds with existing law. He can argue by analogy or
extension from existing law. He can predict what he believes a court would
or should hold on an issue not heretofore decided. He can urge that
existing law should lead to a result in the particular case even if that issue
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Predicting how courts will apply the rule's objective standard
to the actual facts in a case is difficult. A review of the case
law, however, reveals that courts hold the first prong of the rule
to require: that an attorney have a reasonable basis for believing
he has a case against each defendant named m the complaint; 61
that in class action suits, the same plaintiff's claims be typical
of the class and protective of the class' interests; 62 that an
attorney recognize and deal with the established law and not
present arguments devoid of any "colorable legal basis" ;63 that
an attorney know the law regarding federal subject matter juris-
diction; 64 and that an attorney have knowledge of well-estab-
lished res judicata principles. 65
Along with the above specific holdings, courts have provided
some general guidelines regarding Rule l's required prefiling
inquiry In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v Burroughs Corp.,
Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals contended
that "[ain argument in the teeth of uncited and undistinguished
contrary authority is not warranted by existing law An argument
that does not mention directly contrary authority is not a good
faith argument for its modification or reversal." 67 Judge Kauf-
man of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Eastway Con-
struction Corp. v City of New York65 stated that "where it is
patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success
under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument
has not heretofore been decided.
Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 194; see infra notes 193-204, 209-10 and accompanying text
for the limitations Judge Schwarzer places on arguments for changing the law.
63 Albnght, 788 F.2d at 1221; see Underwood, Legal Ethics and Class Actions:
Problems, Tactics and Judicial Responses, 71 Ky. L.J. 787, 819 (1982-83) ("[N]ew
sanctions provided in the rule will deter counsel from filing frivolous claims against
multiple defendants, 'dragnet-style. ' ").
63 Umoil, Inc. v. E. F Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 558 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 83 (1987); see infra notes 141-54 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Untoil holding.
63 Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 206.
6, Orange Prod. Credit v. Frontline Ventures Ltd., 792 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir.
1986).
65 Cannon v. Loyola Umv. of Chicago, 784 F.2d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987).
809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J., dissenting from the denial of a sua
sponte request for en banc hearing).
67 Id. at 586; see infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
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can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it
stands, Rule 11 has been violated. ' 69 In addition, the court in
Zaldivar v City of Los Angelese° held that sanctions must be
imposed "if the paper is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or
without factual foundation." 71
Even though the requirement of a reasonable prefiling in-
quiry applies to both attorneys and unrepresented parties, courts
retain discretion not to hold pro se parties to the higher objective
standard. 72 The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 11 provide
that the court may "take account of the special circumstances
that often arise in pro se situations.1 73
C. The Second Prong: Improper Purpose
Rule lI's second prong requires that the pleading, motion,
or other paper must not be filed "for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation." 7 4 The only improper purpose
violating former Rule 11 was intent to cause delay in the litiga-
tion process . 5 The drafters of the amended rule recognized that
attorneys abuse the judicial system for reasons other than de-
lay 76 Thus, a finding of any improper purpose will violate the
amended rule. 77
19 Id. at 254.
70 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
71 Id. at 831.
72 FED. R. Civ P 11 advisory committee's note; see Miller, supra note 15, at 27:
Since a higher standard of conduct can be demanded from an attorney
than from a lay client, the type of behavior required to trigger sanctions
need not be as culpable as that which warrants dismissal. At least the court
now has the discretion to punish the individual at fault. Not only does this
conform more closely to our notions of fairness, but it is more likely to
have a deterrent effect on future abuse.
71 FED. R. Crv P I 1 advisory committee's note.
1" FED. R. Crv P 11.
75 Id.
76 FED. R. Civ P 11 advisory committee's note; see Schwarzer, supra note 3, at
196 ("Improper purpose may be manifested by excessive persistence in pursuing a claim
or defense in the face of repeated adverse rulings, or by obdurate resistance out of
proportion to the amounts or issues at stake.").
7 See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 196 & nn.54-58 for examples of cases finding
an improper purpose. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (loth Cir.
1985) (motion brought solely for purpose of delay); McLaughlin v. Western Casualty &
Sur. Co., 603 F Supp. 978 (S.D. Ala. 1985) (motion was untimely and filed purely for
improper purpose of delaying trial).
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"Improper purpose" implies that courts should inquire into
an attorney's subjective iiotivations. 78 Some courts, however,
apply an objective standard due to the ambiguity of the language
and policies underlying the amendments. 79 They infer from the
record and circumstances whether a legitimate purpose exists. 80
An objective standard was used to determine an "improper
purpose" in Davis v Veslan Enterprises.8' In a state court ac-
tion, the plaintiff Davis sued two in-state defendants, Veslan
and Collins, for the negligent operation of a tractor-trailer al-
legedly causing the death of Davis' son. Davis subsequently
added two out-of-state defendants, Mack Trucks, Inc. and Wag-
ner, the manufacturer of the brake system in the tractor-trailer 82
The jury awarded Davis $1 million in compensatory damages
and $12 million in punitive damages. 83 On the date set for
hearing Davis' motion for judgment on the verdict, Wagner filed
a petition to remove the case to federal court.8 4 The state court
judgment could not be entered until the case was remanded. 5
The Fifth Circuit held that because Wagner would benefit in
substantial interest savings by delaying entry of the judgment,
an improper purpose could be inferred.8 6
", See Nelken, supra note 7, at 1320 & n.51 (commenting that the improper purpose
clause retains the subjective standard of former Rule 11). But see Schwarzer, supra note
3, at 195 ("In considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper purpose, the
court need not delve into the attorney's subjective intent.").
" E.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1538; Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831;
McLaughlin, 603 F Supp. at 982.
0 McLaughlin, 603 F Supp. at 982 ("The filing of this removal petition was not
an oversight caused by inexperience. The Court finds that some improper motive
was present "); see Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council,
582 F Supp. 1519, 1522 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("Given the claimed expertise and experience
of these attorneys, a strong inferences arises that their bringing of an action such as this
was for an improper purpose."); Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 195:
The record in the case and all of the surrounding circumstances should
afford an adequate basis for determimng whether particular papers for
proceedings caused delay that was unnecessary, whether they caused in-
crease in the cost of litigation that was needless, or whether they lacked
any apparent legitimate purpose. Findings on these points would suffice to
support an inference of an improper purpose.
1 765 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985).
'z Id. at 495.
Id. at 496.
' Id.
Id.
,6 Id. at 500.
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D. Violations
An obvious question facing courts is whether both prongs
of amended Rule 11 must be violated before sanctions are im-
posed. The "reasonable inquiry" language and the "improper
purpose" language are connected by the word "and," suggesting
an independent analysis of conduct under each prong.87 Never-
theless, the court in In re Ronco, Inc. 88 addressing the issue
squarely, concluded that the absence of an improper purpose
"does not insulate from sanctions the lawyer who fails the
alternative objective standard.' '89
Similarly, in Eastway Construction Corp. v City of New
York,9° the Second Circuit interpreted amended Rule 11's stan-
dard to be whether the "pleading has been interposed for any
improper purpose, or where, after reasonable inquiry, a com-
petent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the
pleading is well grounded in fact and law ,,91 Although the
court found no evidence that the suit was brought for an im-
proper purpose, 92 sanctions were imposed based on the attorney's
failure to conduct a reasonable prefiling inquiry 93
The Ninth Circuit in Zaldivar v City of Los Angeles9 4 raised
the issue of a two-prong violation requirement but reached a
limited holding: if a paper satisfies the rule's prefiling inquiry
into the facts and law, it is not sanctionable as harassment. 95
Unlike the Zaldivar court, many courts do not address the
"improper purpose" question until they have determined that
the paper fails under the first prong of the rule. 96
7 Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832.
- 105 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
'1 Id. at 498 (emphasis in original). The court observed, however, that evidence of
an improper purpose "could well be an aggravating factor." Id.
762 F.2d at 243.
Id. at 254 (emphasis in original).
92 Id.
93 Id. Contra McLaughlin, 603 F Supp. at 982 (stating that "[i]f an attorney fails
out of negligence to discharge the first burden, improper motive must still be proven").
780 F.2d at 823.
Id. at 832; see Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 196 ("If a reasonably clear legal
justification can be shown for the filing of the paper in question, no improper purpose
can be found and sanctions are inappropriate.").
96 See, e.g., Huettig & Schromm, Inc., 790 F.2d at 1427; Davis, 765 F.2d at 500;
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 763 F.2d at 1185, 1187; McLaughlin, 603 F Supp. at 982.
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III. RULE 1l's DETERRENT POLICY
A major reason for former Rule 1I's ineffectiveness was its
failure to deter abuses of the judicial system. 97 This failure was
primarily due to the reluctance of courts to sanction attorneys. 98
To encourage the deterrence policy underlying the new rule,99
the drafters of the amendments removed the court's discretion
regarding attorney discipline by mandating sanctions'00 for rule
violations. 01
A. Mandatory Sanctions
Amended Rule 11 provides for sanctions as follows:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of
this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.10 2
The most significant part of the sanction provision is the
mandatory language "shall impose."10 3 This directive'04 requires
I' FED. R. Civ P 11 advisory committee's note.
9 Id., supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
" FErD. R. CIv P II advisory committee's note ("Greater attention by the distnct
courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate,
should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process
by lessemng frivolous claims or defenses."); Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 185 (Judge
Schwarzer believes the rule "is aimed at deterring and, if necessary, pumshing improper
conduct rather than merely compensating the prevailing party."); Eastway Constr. Corp.
v. City of New York, 637 F Supp. 558, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
269 (1987). But see Nelken, supra note 7, at 1323 ("Although denominated a sanction
provision, in reality it is more appropriately characterized as a cost-shifting tech-
nique. ") (quoting Professor Authur Miller, Reporter to the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee that fashioned the 1983 Rule I I amendments).
1-o "The word 'sanctions' in the caption, for example, stresses a deterrent orienta-
tion in dealing with improper pleadings, motions or other papers." FED. R. CIv P 11
advisory committee's note.
101 FED. R. Cry P 11 (1980) (amended 1983).
102 Id.
103 Id.
04 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987) ("Unlike the statutory provisions that vest the
district court with 'discretion' to award fees, Rule 11 is clearly phrased as a directive.").
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the court to sanction the violator once it determines a violation
has occurred. The rule's language thus focuses the court's atten-
tion on punishing pleading and motion abuses. 105
Other parts of the sanction provision work with the man-
datory language to accomplish the deterrent effect desired by
the amendment drafters.'0 First, in addition to a party's motion
for sanctions, the-court itself may Initiate the sanction process.10 7
Second, sanctions may apply to a pro se party, an attorney, his
client, or both an attorney and his client. 08 Third, the rule's
example of appropriate sanctions-reasonable expenses and at-
torney's fees-provides courts with some guidance in punishing
violators. 109
In addition to the actual language of amended Rule 11, the
Advisory Committee's note emphasizes the court's role in deter-
ring judicial system abuses. As expressed by the Committee:
"[tihe detection and punishment of a violation of the signing
requirement is part of the court's responsibility for securing
the system's effective operation.""' 0
B. The Court's Discretionary Power
Under Rule l1's sanction provision, the court retains discre-
tion to determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation in
question,"' as well as who should be sanctioned: the attorney,
0, FED. R. CIv P 11 advisory committee's note; see Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,
770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that the rule's mandatory language
"concentrates the distrct court's discretion on the selection of an appropnate sanction
rather than on the decision to impose sanctions.") (emphasis in original).
206 See supra note 99.
... FED. R. CIv. P 11 advisory committee's note; WRIGHT, supra note 41, at §
1334.
0 FED. R. Crv. P i1 advisory committee's note; Wiuoirr, supra note 41, at §
1334.
" See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
"' FED. R. CIv P 11 advisory committee's note.
22 Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987) ("While some sanction is
required when an infraction occurs, the determination of what is 'appropnate' is still a
matter left to the sound discretion of the distnct court."); Eastway Constr. Corp., 637
F Supp. at 565 (stating that "the court of necessity has a great deal of discretion in
deciding on the nature of the sanction"); WRiGHT, supra note 41, at § 1334.
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the client, the attorney and the client, or the pro se party 112 As
stated by the Advisory Committee, courts may "tailor sanctions
to the particular facts of the case.""' Interestingly, the Com-
mittee suggests that courts consider the subjective intent of the
violator:114
The reference in the former text to wilfulness as a prerequisite
to disciplinary action has been deleted. However, in consider-
ing the nature and severity of the sanctions to be imposed, the
court should take account of the state of the attorney's or
party's actual or presumed knowledge when the pleading or
other paper was signed." 5
Thus, to further the deterrent policy of the amendments, an
attorney who deliberately abuses the system 16 should be sub-
jected to more severe sanctions than one who violates the rule
due to lack of experience or ability 117
William W Schwarzer, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, considered an authority on Rule
11, follows the above approach." 8 He believes that the same
standard of conduct should not apply to all attorneys," 9 and
that when tailoring sanctions courts should be free to consider
factors such as the attorney's reputation, prior misconduct, ex-
perience, competence and intent.' 20 The Huettig & Schromm v
112 FED. R. Civ P 11 advisory committee's note; see Miller, supra note 15, at 27
(Rule II is enforced by imposing sanctions against either the party or the lawyer).
Judge Schwarzer advises courts to determine who should be sanctioned:
Where the violation is primarily a professional dereliction, it is appropriate
to impose the sanctions on the attorney and prohibit reimbursement by the
client. Where, on the other hand, the violation may reflect deliberate
litigation strategy, at least some part of the sanctions can fairly be imposed
on the client although the client's instructions do not absolve the attorney
from professional accountability for carrying them out.
Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 203.
"3 FED. R. Crv P 11 advisory committee's note.
114 Id.
" Id.
"6 Eastway Constr. Corp., 637 F Supp. at 572-73 for a discussion of the subjective
intent of the attorney.
Id., Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 201-02.
' Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 201-02.
119 Id. at 201.
120 Id.
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Landscape Contractors Council2 opinion serves as an illustra-
tion. Judge Schwarzer stated that the attorneys bringing the
labor-related lawsuit "knew or should have known that
their client had neither a cause of action nor any claim to invoke
this court's jurisdiction." 22 Because of their experience and ex-
pertise in labor law, Judge Schwarzer held that "a strong infer-
ence arises that their bringing of an action such as this was for
an improper purpose.' '1 23 He then sanctioned the attorneys in
the amount of $5,625.00, which represented the amount of the
opposing counsel's fees. 124 He further directed that the client pay
no part of the sanctions and that the court's opinion be circu-
lated within the sanctioned attorneys' firm.121
C. Selecting Appropriate Sanctions
Courts are not limited to imposing reasonable attorney's fees
as the sanction for Rule 11 violations.126 Other alternatives exist
which may be more appropriate for the conduct in question. 27
Because the rule's goal is to punish and to deter abuses of the
judicial system, not simply to shift costs,128 courts must penalize
violators in a manner which furthers deterrence. 129 However, to
deter only abuse, not creative use of the system, courts should
impose the "least severe" sanctions necessary to effect a punish-
ment. 30
Judge Schwarzer's variable standard of conduct' is useful
in determining which sanctions are appropriate. A bench repri-
121 582 F Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (1986).
In Id. at 1522.
123 Id.
12 Id.
In Id. at 1522-23.
'2 The language of Rule 11 states that the court must impose "an appropriate
sanction, which may include a reasonable attorney's fee." FED. R. Crv P I1
(emphasis added).
I" Cabell, 810 F.2d at 466 (stating that a rule violation does not automatically
require that attorney's fees be awarded). See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 201-04 for a
discussion of alternative sanctions.
In FED. R. Crv P II advisory committee's note; Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 201.
219 In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450
(1987).
130 Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 201. The courts in Cabell, 810 F.2d at 466 and
Eastway Constr. Corp., 637 F Supp. at 565 followed this approach.
M See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
mand or an order of reprimand circulated within the sanctioned
attorney's firm may suffice as punishment for inexperienced
attorneys or first-time violators .132 On the other hand, for attor-
neys repeatedly or intentionally violating the rule, the only ef-
fective sanction may be referring the matter to the state bar
association for disciplinary action or barring the attorney from
court for a period of time.1 33 Courts must keep in mind, how-
ever, that severe sanctions such as these must comply with due
process requirements, 134 including a full hearing prior to the
imposition of the sanctions.135
Reasonable attorney's fees may be the appropriate sanction
for conduct lying between the above two extremes. 136 Courts
must ensure that the fees are both "reasonable" and limited to
those actually generated by the misconduct. 137 Therefore, any
request for attorney's fees should be accompanied by an hourly
breakdown showing the time spent resisting the offending claim
or motion. 38 Because courts have interpreted the rule to impose
a duty to mitigate damages, 139 fees representing a vigorous de-
fense to a frivolous claim should be closely scrutinized and
probably reduced. 140
D Sanction Power in Action
In Unioil, Inc. v E. F Hutton & Co.,'14 the court upheld
Rule 11 sanctions involving a sizeable amount of attorneys'
fees. 142 The plaintiffs had filed a class action suit against the
defendants143 for allegedly scheming "to sell Unloil stock short
132 Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 201-02.
3 Id. at 204.
" FED. R. Crv P 11 advisory committee's note.
31 Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 204.
136 Due process considerations also come into play when attorney's fees are imposed
as a sanction. See Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 202 ("[C]ourts need to be wary about
imposing fines under the rule. The criminal character of a fine brings into play additional
due process safeguards.").
117 Id. at 202-03.
131 In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1185.
"I Id., see Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 202.
4 In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1185.
1-' 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 83 (1987).
142 Id.
141 The defendants named were professional investment companies and individuals.
Id. at 552.
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in violation of federal antitrust and securities laws."' 144 The
plaintiffs were Umoil, Umoil's chairman of the board, the Heck
companies which owned large amounts of Unioil stock, and
Zelezny, a stockbroker who owned Umoil stock. Zelezny was
the only plaintiff not connected with Umoil management.145 The
plaintiffs were represented by Alioto and co-counsel Barton.
Alioto never personally determined whether Zelezny was a suit-
able representative for the class of Umoil stockholders. 146 Zelez-
ny's deposition testimony revealed that he was not a suitable
representative. 147
The complaint alleged that Umoil stockholders sold stock at
a loss due to the defendants' misrepresentations; Zelezny testified
that he did not sell Umoil stock but purchased stock believing
the price would go up. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs
sold Umoil stock at "artificially depressed prices" for a three-
month period; Zelezny testified that the prices were fair during
that period. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs bought and
sold stock in reliance on the defendants' misrepresentations;
Zelezny testified his stock transactions were not made in reliance
on the defendants' statements. 148
Shortly after the deposition, the plaintiffs requested a vol-
untary dismissal, without prejudice, of the class action. 149 The
court conditioned the dismissal on the requirement that the
plaintiffs and/or their attorneys pay the defendants' expenses
and attorneys' fees in an amount of $165,774.84.150 The court
also imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Alioto. Among other
things, the court found that he had not conducted a reasonable
inquiry into the facts to ensure Zelezny's claims were typical of
the class or to ensure there was no conflict of interest in repre-
senting both Umoil and its stockholders. 5' Alioto was directed
I "Id.
145 Id.
:46 Id.
I Id. at 552-53.
149Id.
141 Because the suit was a class action, the plaintiffs moved for dimissal under FED.
R. Civ. P 23(e) and 41(a)(1). The plaintiffs then requested the court to approve the
dismissal without prejudice under FED. R. Civ. P 41(a)(2). Id. at 553.
11 Id. at 554.
5 Id. at 558.
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to pay defendants $294,140.10 in attorneys' fees within thirty
days. That amount would be reduced by any payments made by
the plaintiffs or their attorneys within the thirty-day period
pursuant to the conditioned dismissal. 12
The Ninth Circuit upheld the Rule 11 sanction award on the
following basis: Alioto's firm claimed to be experienced in busi-
ness matters; Alioto was under no time constraints and therefore
could have made a more thorough prefiling inquiry; and, the
lawsuit "threatened defendants with massive liability and fore-
seeably aroused a vigorous and costly defense."'15 3 The court
further held that although a sanction in the amount of $294,141
was substantial, it was not "patently unreasonable.' 1 54
The Ninth Circuit had reached a different conclusion in the
earlier In Re Yagman decision.15- In a defamation action lasting
two years, the district court granted a directed verdict in favor
of the defendants and sanctioned the plaintiffs' attorney in the
amount of $250,000156 based on violations of Rule 11 and 28
United States Code section 1927 '57 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
directed verdict5 but reversed the order of sanctions. 59
The appellate court found, first of all, that the sanctions
were based upon "an accumulation of all perceived misconduct
from filing through trial, [resulting in] a single postjudgment
retribution in the form of a massive sanction award."' 6 Reject-
ing this manner of imposing sanctions, the court stated that the
deterrence policy of Rule 11 would be better served by imposing
sanctions promptly when a violation occurs.' 6' The court also
112 Id. at 559.
"I Id. at 557.
"4 Id. at 559. The court was sensitive to the amount of potential liability the
defendants faced.
M 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (1987).
151 Id. at 1182. The defendants' actual attorney's fees amounted to $293,000;
however, they requested sanctions in the reduced amount of $250,000. Id.
'57 The district court also found the plaintiff in violation of local rule 27.1. Id.
MS8 Id. at 1176.
119 Id. at 1188.
160 Id. at 1183.
161 Id. The court stated that "[a] proper sanction assessed at the time of a trans-
gression will ordinarily have some measure of deterrent effect on subsequent abuses and
resultant sanctions." Id.
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noted that judges could lessen the amount of sanctions by not
allowing abuses to continue until the end of the case.1 62
Secondly, the court rejected the sanction order because the
district court failed to assess the reasonableness of the attorneys'
fees claimed by the defendant. 63 The district court should have
required the defense attorneys to "itemize and quantify" the
time spent resisting the sanctionable actions and should have
considered the defendants' failure to mitigate damages in an
action they claimed was "frivolous from the start."1 6 Moreover,
the district court should not have overlooked Yagman's ability
to pay a $250,000 penalty 165
In addition to rejecting the manner in which the sanctions
were imposed, the Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court's
finding that Rule 11 had been violated.' Speaking for the court,
Judge Andersen stated that judges must be certain the alleged
misconduct indeed violates the rule and that the awarded sanc-
tions are just and imposed in a manner furthering the purposes
of the rule.167 Otherwise, the "balance between sanctioning im-
proper behavior and chilling vigorous advocacy" will be threat-
ened.1 68
IV RuLE ll's EFFECT ON CREATIVE ADVOCACY
The purpose of Rule 11 is to encourage "litigants to stop,
think and investigate" their claims before filing them. 69 The
rule's requirements, however, may cause attorneys to "think,
double-think, and triple-think themselves into paralysis. 1' 70 The
262 Id. Ironically, the court remarked: "It appears the efficiency achieved by levying
two years' worth of sanctions in one post-trial lump has been paid for in wasted judicial
resources and money." Id.
262 Id. at 1185.
'" Id. "To allow punishment, however, to take the form of such a generic,
all-encompassing, massive, post-trial retribution, with no indication whatsoever of rea-
sonableness, would send shivers through the bar." Id.
162 Id.
26 Id. The Ninth Circuit applied the subjective good faith standard of former Rule
11 to the case because the 1983 amendments had not been enacted when Yagman filed
the complaint. Id.
167 Id. at 1183.
166 Id.
169 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 2, at 192.
170 Miller, supra note 15, at 32.
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Advisory Committee recognized this potential "chilling" effect
on creative advocacy and suggested that in applying the rule
courts consider whether a claim is based on a "plausible view
of the law "171
A. The "Plausible" Standard
"Plausible" may be defined as "superficially worthy of be-
lief." " This definition indicates that a subjective determination
is made when applying the term to a particular position or
argument. Therefore, it is not surprising that courts differ as to
whether a certain legal argument satisfies this standard. 73 As
expressed by one commentator, "[j]udges sanctioning legal ar-
guments assume that a bright line divides legal theories that are
warranted from those that should be sanctioned. But the line is
not so clear. One lawyer's novel extension of the law is another's
unwarranted abuse of the judicial system."' 74
In dealing with an imprecise standard, attorneys cannot pre-
dict which legal theories may wm and which may fail. 175 Inevi-
tably, such indefiniteness will cause attorneys to avoid filing
novel claims altogether, especially if their arguments are based
on innovative theories for modifying current law 176
B. Interpretations of the Standard
The Zaldivar v City of Los Angeles77 decision illustrates
how courts can differ regarding the plausibility standard. The
plaintiffs alleged that a recall election violated the federal Voting
Rights Act. 7 8 The Act required that in jurisdictions subject to
" FED. R. Crv P 11 advisory committee's note.
'72 WEBSTER's TH RD NEw INTERNATiONAL DICTIoNARY (1981).
171 See Note, supra note 7, at 640-41 for a discussion of cases differing on the
standard. Courts have equated the "plausible" standard to a "frivolous" standard.
1,4 Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, 11 LTGATION, Winter 1985, at 55.
'71 Note, supra note 7, at 639.
,76 Id. "Conflicting notions of plausibility, as much as overly narrow ones, have a
chilling effect on litigation, leading prudent lawyers to steer wide of even potential
implausibility by avoiding filing nonstandard claims." Id. But see Miller, supra note 15,
at 32-33 ("IT]hose who choose to become lawyers-especially litigators-are not likely
to lose their advocate's instinct or zeal out of fear of sanctions.").
M7 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
7 Id. at 826; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(b)(f), aa-la (1982).
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its bilingual provisions, any materials relating to the electoral
process must be published in both the English language and the
language of the minority group. The defendants initially failed
to follow these bilingual requirements. 7 9 The district court stated
that a "cursory reading of [the Voting Rights Act] would indi-
cate to a reasonable person that there was no basis for bringing
this lawsuit."' 180 It found the plaintiffs' argument to be "totally
frivolous"'' because the Act applied only to state entities pub-
lishing recall notices, not to private individuals as in the case at
hand. The district court further reasoned that the recall notice
"was not information relating to the electoral process.' ' 8 2 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the plaintiffs' contrary arguments
to be plausible.8
Another case bringing the plausibility standard into issue is
Stevens v Lawyer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co.'14 Stevens
sued attorney Nimocks and the partnership of Nimocks and
Taylor for malpractice in relation to Stevens' criminal trial held
in November of 1977 i15 During the pendency of the malpractice
suit, Nimocks was declared bankrupt and dismissed from the
case. Taylor, who was not sued individually, joined another
partnership. 8 6 The new partnership's insurance carrier, Lawyer's
Mutual, provided liability coverage on all partners for any claims
arising after April 1, 1977 17
When Stevens sought a declaratory judgment that Lawyer's
Mutual would be liable for any judgment entered against Taylor
in the malpractice suit, Lawyer's Mutual responded with a mo-
tion to dismiss and a motion for Rule 11 sanctions.18 The court
dismissed the complaint because Stevens never alleged that Law-
yer's Mutual insured Nimocks or the Nimocks and Taylor part-
79 Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 826.
190 Id. at 832.
I Id. at 827.
1 Id. at 833.
", Id. The court held that "a competent attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could
argue in good faith that a notice of intention to recall an office holder provides
information relating to the electoral process." Id.
789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986).
"' Id. at 1057-58.
' Id. at 1058.
18 Id.
I" Id.
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nership. 189 In his motions for reconsideration, Stevens directed
the court's attention to a North Carolina statute making "[a]fl
partners jointly and severally liable for the acts of the
partnership.' 190 The court, nevertheless, found Stevens' argu-
ments to be frivolous because Lawyer's Mutual had no obliga-
tion to insure the defendant named in the underlying suit. Rule
11 sanctions were imposed. 191 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
sanctions, holding that the action for declaratory relief "had a
reasonable basis in fact and law and was not-objectively frivo-
lous."1 92
C. The Golden Eagle Case
In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v Burroughs Corp.,193
Judge Schwarzer introduced two additional requirements for
meeting the plausibility standard: argument identification and
citation to contrary authority 194 Judge Schwarzer found that the
defense attorneys' firm, Kirkland & Ellis, had presented argu-
ments "supportable, both legally and factually " Because the
arguments were not identified properly, however, they were in
violation of Rule 11.195 More precisely, he stated that Kirkland
& Ellis should have identified its arguments as being for the
"extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," not as
being "warranted by existing law 196 Such failure to identify
the proper argument was an attempt to mislead the court. 97
The facts of the case reveal that Golden Eagle Distributing
Corporation sued Burroughs in Minnesota state court for the
negligent manufacture of a computer system. Burroughs re-
moved the case to Minnesota federal district court and then
successfully moved the court for a change of venue to the
19 Id.
190 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (1982).
191 The sanction imposed against the plaintiff's attorney was a reprimand printed
in a published opimon. The court also found the plaintiff's attorney filed the second
motion for reconsideration for an improper purpose. Stevens, 789 F.2d at 1059.
192 Id. at 1060.
1- 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
194 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1534.
"95 Id.
196 Id., FED. R. CIv P 11 (1980) (amended 1983).
197 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1534.
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Northern District of California.""8 In a motion for summary
judgment, Kirkland & Ellis contended that Califorma, not Min-
nesota, law applied and that under California law the plaintiff's
claim was time-barred. In support of its argument, Kirkland &
Ellis relied on Van Dusen v Barrack,199 claiming that because
Minnesota would have dismissed the suit on the basis of forum
non conveniens, California law had to apply They further as-
serted that "Ilthis case falls squarely within the forum non
conveniens exception noted by the Court in Van Dusen.' ' 200
The district court found the defendant's argument to be
misleading in two respects. First, Van Dusen had not carved out
a forum non conveniens exception to the general rule that the
transferring court's law applies; the case merely raised the ques-
tion without resolving it. Second, Kirkland & Ellis failed to
mention that the Minnesota court could not have dismissed the
case based on forum non convenens unless there was an avail-
able alternative forum. 201
After Kirkland & Ellis presented its argument again in a brief
opposing the Rule 11 sanctions, Judge Schwarzer recognized that
the arguments satisfied the rule's requirements, being a "good
faith argument for the extension of existing law "202 How-
ever, because the defendant's original argument in support of
the summary judgment motion had been presented as "war-
ranted by existing law," the court imposed sanctions .203 Judge
Schwarzer "looked not to the merits of the position originally
taken by the plaintiff, but to the manner in which the position
was advocated.''204
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument identifi-
cation requirement, stating:
It is not always easy to decide whether an argument is based
on established law or is an argument for the extension of
existing law Whether the case being litigated is or is not
198 Id.
1- 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
2 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1534-35.
211 Id. at 1535.
"2 Id., FED. R. Civ. P 11.
" Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1534.
11 Id. at 1535.
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materially the same as earlier precedent is frequently the very
issue which prompted the litigation in the first place. Such
questions can be close. 2°5
The court expressed concern over the chilling effect an ar-
gument identification requirement could have on the enthusiastic
advocate. 206 With such a requirement, an attorney may be found
in violation of Rule 11 whenever he loses an argument which he
claims is supported by established law Courts rarely find a
losing argument warranted by current law 207 Faced with poten-
tial sanctions, an attorney may choose to play it safe by not
pursuing creative and novel legal theories.
In rejecting the argument identification requirement, the court
also rejected the idea that one unsupportable argument within a
pleading or motion is violative of Rule 11. The court stated that
"[t]he Rule permits the imposition of sanctions only when the
'pleading, motion or other paper' itself is frivolous, not when
one of the arguments in support of a pleading or motion is
frivolous." 20 8
As an additional requirement for satisfying the plausibility
standard, the district court held that Kirkland & Ellis should
have cited authorities contrary to the case upon which it relied. 20 9
Judge Schwarzer specifically found that Rule 3.3 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which imposes a duty on attor-
neys to cite adverse authority, is a "necessary corollary to Rule
11.-210
20 Id. at 1540.
101Id. The court noted that the requirement would "create a conflict between the
lawyer's duty zealously to represent his client and the lawyer's own interest in
avoiding rebuke. The concern on the part of the bar that this type of requirement will
chill advocacy is understandable." Id.
2 Id.
=8 Id.
Id. at 1535.
210 Id. at 1535-36.
Rule 3.3 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position
of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983).
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The Ninth Circuit clearly rejected this requirement, recogniz-
ing that "mandatory sanctions would ride on close decisions
concerning whether or not one case is or is not the same as
another. ' 211 Not only would the attorney's burden of research
be greatly increased, but the court would be evaluating argu-
ments under both the Rule 11 standards and ethical standards. 212
As expressed by the court,
neither Rule 11 nor any other rule imposes a requirement that
the lawyer, in addition to advocating the cause of his client,
step first into the shoes of opposing counsel to find all poten-
tially contrary authority, and finally into the robes of the judge
to decide whether the authority is indeed contrary or whether
it is distinguishable. 23
According to the Ninth Circuit, following the district court's
approach would lead to an undesirable result-"blur[ring] the
roles of judge and advocate. '214
The case did not end with the Ninth Circuit's reversal. The
plaintiffs requested a hearing en banc, which was denied. Five
judges dissented from the demal, however, and reported their
opinion supporting Judge Schwarzer's holding. 215
Judge Noonan, writing for the dissenters, found that Kirk-
land & Ellis did more than fail to properly identify its argu-
ment-"[ilt simply misrepresented the law "216 Accordingly, the
actions of Kirkland & Ellis were for an improper purpose-
misleading the court-and were sanctionable under Rule 11. In
addition, the dissenters supported the combination of ethical
standards with Rule 11 standards. They observed that Rule 1l's
211 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 801 F.2d at 1542.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. The court made the following observation:
The role of judges is not merely to "match the colors of the case at hand
against the colors of many sample cases spread out upon their desk.
It is when the colors do not match, when the references m the index fail,
when there is no decisive precedent that the senous business of the judge
begins."
Id. (quoting B. CARDozo, THE NAruRi OF TnE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 21 (1922)). But see
Miller, supra note 15, at 33-35 for a discussion of changing the neutral roles of judges.
232 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987).
216 Id. at 586.
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language requiring a paper to be "warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal
of existing law" was based on the language of Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(2) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 217
Moreover, the dissenters suggested that the majority's concern
with chilling zealous advocacy was misplaced, stating that
"[v]igorous advocacy is, necessarily, truthful advocacy ",218
D Restraining Courts' Sanction Powers
The Golden Eagle case supports one study's findings regard-
ing Rule 11, namely that "there is a good deal of interjudge
disagreement over what actions constitute a violation of the
rule. ' 219 The lack of uniform standards together with the expan-
sive application of the rule by some judges20 will inevitably deter
creative advocacy Nonetheless, judges are the final arbiters, and
the system is dependent upon them to "distinguish legitimate
advocacy from illegitimate harassment or attrition and to avoid
overkill by calibrating sanctions to fit the character of the con-
duct." 22
In Eastway Construction Corp. v City of New York,m the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals recogmzed that the power to
sanction abuses necessarily includes the power to "overkill. '"23
Observing that "[v]ital changes have been wrought by those
217 Id. at 588.
DR 7-102(A)(2) provides:
(a) In Ins representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under
existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it
can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law.
MODEL CODE OF PROFassIoNAL REsPONsBILiTY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1981). It should be noted
that the language of DR 7-102(A)(2) provides for a subjective standard, rather than an
objective standard.
218 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp., 809 F.2d at 588.
219 T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PROBLEMS AND MA-
TERiALS 145 (1987) (quoting S. KAssIN, AN EwMIcAL STUDy OF RuLE II SANcTioNs 45
(1985)).
22 See Nelken, supra note 7, at 1323-25, 1347-52 for a discussion of Judge Schwar-
zer's expansive use of sanctions.
221 Miller, supra note 15, at 33.
762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
Id. at 254.
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members of the bar who have dared to challenge the received
wisdom," the court cautioned against the use of hindsight and
suggested that "any and all doubts must be resolved in favor of
the signer."'24
1. A Better Approach
The district court in Eastway Construction Corp. v City of
New York (Eastway I1) developed a two-part analysis for
applying Rule 11 sanctions which would lessen the chilling effects
on innovative and enthusiastic advocacy The court first evalu-
ated the costs incurred by the party entitled to the sanction
award. Second, the court considered any mitigating factors which
should reduce that amount .2 6 In deternming the costs incurred,
the court began with the lodestar figure: the reasonable number
of hours the offended party spent resisting the claim multiplied
by a reasonable attorney's fee. The court suggested increasing
the lodestar amount if the offended attorney's work was notably
outstanding, or if the sanctioned party's conduct was remarkably
bad.,, 7
As to mitigating circumstances, the court discussed several
factors, including: whether the violation was wilful or negli-
gent;28 whether the offender was an inexperienced attorney or a
reputable attorney with no prior Rule 11 violations; 29 whether
the sanctioned party was able to pay the lodestar figure;"2 0 whether
the offended party needed the reimbursement;2 1 and, whether
the type of litigation involved should be encouraged. 2 2 Of major
UId.
21 637 F Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
22 Id. at 571.
2 Id. The court suggested that the attorney's fee be based on the hourly market
rate. Id.
3 Id. The court stated that a finding of wilfulness was a more serious violation
of the rule than negligence. Id. at 573.
2" Id. The court suggested that lement sanctions would be appropriate for first-
time offenders. "Similarly, where a filing has been deemed to be legally, as opposed to
factually, frivolous, the court should be more lement on nonspecialists. " Id.
2" Id. "The poorer the offender, the smaller need be the sanction to ensure the
desired deterrent effect." Id.
21 Id. at 574. The court stated that individuals should be reimbursed for costs
more so than major corporations. Id.
232 Id., see infra notes 241-48.
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importance, however, was the court's consideration of the "de-
gree of frivolousness" of the paper. 233
The Eastway 1I court recognized that not all arguments
clearly fit into the frivolous-nonfrivolous dichotomy Judges are
forced to draw arbitrary lines in many cases. 234 The result is that
attorneys are placed in conflict-of-interest situations:
Attorneys are thus placed m a dilemma because they have
the right-in fact, they have an ethical obligation (subject to
tactical considerations)-to present to the court all the nonfri-
volous arguments that might be made on their clients' behalf,
even if only barely nonfrivolous. They are forced by their
position as advocates in the legal profession to live close to
the line, wherever the courts may draw it. Yet Rule 11 threatens
with severe sanctions if they miscalculate ever so slightly the
location of that line. 235
The Eastway II court proposed a method to relieve the
"tension between creativity and sanctions." Instead of catego-
rizing papers as being either frivolous or nonfrivolous, judges
should determine where the arguments lie on a continuum.2 6
For those arguments found to be clearly frivolous, reasonable
attorney's fees should be awarded. For arguments approaching
the nonfrivolous end of the continuum, the sanctions should be
"more moderate.' '237 Such an approach furthers the deterrent
policy of the rule without stifling the innovativeness of the bar 28
Applying this analysis to the facts before it, the Eastway II
court found the plaintiff's argument to be only "marginally
frivolous. ' 23 9 That finding was important to the court's decision
to award sanctions in the amount of $1,000, instead of the
originally requested $58,550 in actual attorney's fees. The court,
justifying the reduced award, admonished judges to "take care
"I Id. at 574.
2' Id.
13 Id., see Nelken, supra note 7, at 1340 n.175 (stating that an attorney "has a
professional duty to err on the side of the client. This duty is sorely tested by a rule
which, in close cases, may lead to sanctions against the lawyer who fulfills it.").
236 Eastway Constr Corp., 637 F Supp. at 574.
37 Id.
21 Id. at 574-75.
29 Id. at 584.
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not to use their almost unlimited Rule 11 powers to punish in a
vindictive and excessively harsh manner "24
2. Encouraging Challenges
The Eastway I court was sensitive to one factor which many
courts apparently ignore, namely that "[s]ome litigations should
be, if not encouraged, at least not discouraged."241 In the court's
view, suits against the government fall into this category They
provide, among other things, a check on official "arrogance and
lawlessness." 242 The early challenges to the "separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessy v Ferguson243 were no doubt considered friv-
olous. Nevertheless, hindsight proves that those challenges paved
the way for the holding in Brown v Board of Education.2"
Likewise, challenges to the Swain v Alabama 45 decision led to
the recent decision in Batson v Kentucky 24
In order to ensure that our law continues to expand and
grow, courts should not apply Rule 11 in a manner that deters
challenges to bad precedents.2 47 As expressed by one commen-
tator, "[t]he development of the law is threatened if Rule 11 is
read 'to penalize litigants because they choose to fight uphill
battles.' "248
CONCLUSION
Although the American judicial system prides itself on giving
wronged persons their day in court, the ever-growing court docket
requires that adjustments and modifications be made to stream-
w Id.
14' Id. at 575.
242 Id.
-1 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (separate but equal facilities for different races do not
violate the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution).
- 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (doctrine of separate but equal facilities for different races
violates the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution); Eastway Constr.
Corp., 637 F Supp. at 575.
-1 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prosecution's striking of
blacks from a jury in a particular case does not violate the equal protection clause).
4 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (equal protection clause does not allow striking black jurors
as a group); Eastway Constr. Corp., 637 F Supp. at 575.
27 Eastway Constr. Corp., 637 F Supp. at 575.
10 Nelken, supra note 7, at 1342.
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line the litigation process. Amended Rule 11 can be a tool for
controlling abusive practices and unnecessary litigation, thus
making attorneys more responsible. But in addition, courts have
a responsibility not to allow applications of Rule 11 to stifle
efforts to change current law
In order to avoid the chilling effect of the rule, courts should
resolve questionable violations in favor of the signer. Moreover,
when faced with clear violations, courts should impose the least
severe sanctions necessary to punish the offender, taking into
consideration any mitigating factors.
There is no way of knowing the extent of Rule 1I's "chill"
on the bar's creativity thus far With proper application, how-
ever, the goals underlying the rule can be achieved without the
undesirable effect of discouraging attorney innovation.
Robin Johnson Collins
